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Barron and Klein (2016; Klein & Barron 2016) discuss the origins of consciousness in 
invertebrates, focusing on insects. They use a neuroethological approach to assess 
insects’ capacity for subjective experience. Singling out the insect cephalic ganglion, they 
explore insects’ neural modeling of space. Moving “beyond insects,” they go on to cover 
box jellies and nematodes, but surprisingly they omit the most likely example of 
consciousness in invertebrates: Cephalopod molluscs have large central brains and 
flexible behavior. Based on neural and behavioral evidence including lateralization of the 
brain, tool use, spatial memory and navigation, concept formation and even personality 
and sense of self, Mather (2007) has suggested that cephalopods are capable of 
subjective experience and that they use the global workplace outlined by Baars (1997) 
and also mentioned by Klein and Barron.  
 
Based partly on this evidence, a group of prominent neuroscientists declared in 2012 that 
consciousness is not confined to mammalian neural structures and that “[n]on-human 
animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, 
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also possess these neurological substrates” (Low 2012). Whereas insects too may be 
candidates for inclusion in the category of sentient animals, cephalopods have already 
been accepted as such by these neuroscientists; hence it is surprising that the present 
authors ignored this declaration. Further evidence for subjective experiences would be 
provided by pain, which is by definition a subjective experience.  
 
Alupay and colleagues (2015) have published the latest in a series of studies on 
cephalopods looking for behavioral evidence of such experiences. They observed 
immediate wound tending, longer term arm guarding, and 24-hour withdrawal from 
touch along with long-term sensitization in nerves, causing both local and general 
lowering of sensory thresholds. They cautiously concluded that pain was difficult to prove, 
suggesting that this might be a case of immediate sensory nociception. Evidence for 
cephalopods’ advanced cognitive capacity is presented in the chapters of Cephalopod 
Cognition (Dickel et al. 2014), including sensitive periods for learning, neural 
representation of space, play, and the use of visual information for camouflage. 
 
A further consequence of this growing evidence of consciousness in cephalopods is an 
increasing recognition of the need to consider their welfare in animal experimentation 
(Berry et al. 2015). In Canada, cephalopods have been granted consideration of welfare in 
animal experimentation equal to that of vertebrates since 1991. After a long process of 
consultation, the European Union’s revised animal welfare regulations also concluded in 
Directive 2010/63/EU Article 1, 3b that cephalopods deserve protection based on “a 
review of the evidence for sentience and capacity to experience pain, suffering, distress 
and lasting harm.” Fiorito et al. (2015) accordingly generated a detailed set of guidelines 





Alupay, J., Hadjisolomou, S.P., and Crook, R.J. (2014) Arm injury produces long-term 
behavioral and neural hypersensitivity in octopus. Neurosci. Lett. 558, 137-142 
 
Baars, B.J. (1997) In the theatre of consciousness: Global workplace theory, a rigorous 
scientific theory of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 4, 292-309 
 
Barron, A.B., and Klein, C. (2016) What insects can tell us about the origins of 
consciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 113, 4900-4908 
 
Berry, A., Vitale, A., Carere, C., and Alleva, E. (2015) EU guidelines for the care and welfare 
of an “exceptional invertebrate class” in scientific research. Ann. Ist. Sup. Sanità 51, 
274-276 
 
Dickel, L., Darmaillacq, A.-S., and Mather, J.A. (2014) Cephalopod Cognition. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
 
Fiorito, G., Affuso, A., Basil, J., Cole, A., de Girolamo, P., D’Angelo, L., Dickel, L., Gestal, C., 
Grasso, F., Kuba, M., Mark, F., Melillo, D., Osorio, D., Perkins, K., Ponte, G., Shashar, 
Animal Sentience 2016.107:  Mather & Carere on Klein & Barron on Insect Sentience 
3 
 
N., Smith, D., Smith, J., and Andrews, P.L.R. (2015) Guidelines for the care and welfare 
of cephalopods in research - a consensus based on an initiative by CephRes, FELASA 
and the Boyd group. Lab. Anim. 49, 1-90 
 
Klein, C., and Barron, A. B. (2016) Insects have the capacity for subjective experience. 
Animal Sentience 2016.100 
 
Low, P. (2012) The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. Francis Crick Memorial 
Conference on consciousness in human and non-human animals, Churchill College, 
Cambridge 
 
Mather, J.A. (2007) Cephalopod consciousness: behavioral evidence. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 
37-48 
